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Abstract. For law enforcement purposes, authorities may either use a method 
of indiscriminate control or an investigative approach aimed at (finding) a 
particular suspect of law-breaking behavior. By applying data matching 
technologies, indiscriminately collected surveillance data are combined with 
data from other sources to select individual citizens. Inspired by insights from 
behavioral research, these citizens may be proactively approached in order to 
steer them towards desired behavior. The authorities present their 
communications as a service. However, selecting and addressing individual 
citizens tends towards investigative practices without the demonstration of any 
law-breaking behavior, thus straining legal certainties related to the distinction 
between control and investigation. Practical examples are provided through 
three case studies, and a number of procedural improvements are suggested to 
reduce the potentially intimidating character of the practices. 
Keywords: surveillance, law enforcement, ANPR, behavioral research, data 
processing 
1   Introduction 
In advance of the annual tax filing due date, in 2011 the Dutch tax authority contacted 
a number of company car drivers. It had come to the tax authority’s attention that they 
had registered their vehicles for professional use only, which would qualify for a tax 
exemption when staying under 500 ‘private’ kilometers annually. The 500 kilometer 
cap may have been exceeded this year, and the agency thus kindly requested the 
contacted drivers to check their records to make sure their tax return would be filed 
correctly once due.1 
This example comes across as a well-intentioned government policy to discourage 
citizens from erroneous tax filing, fitting in the proactive, service-minded and data-
                                                           
1 Sameer van Alfen, "Fiscus Bespioneert Leaserijders," De Telegraaf, February 11, 2011. See 
also Jasper Sluijs, "The Dutch Tax Authority and Lease Car Fraud: Institutionalized 
Intimidation," TILT blog, February 28, 2011, http://vortex.uvt.nl/TILTblog/?p=291. 
driven ‘eGovernment’ role that many public authorities aspire to these days. 
However, the tax authority had reason to believe that the contacted company car 
drivers had in fact exceeded the 500 kilometer cap, because through Automatic 
Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) cameras their cars had been spotted at places that 
suggested extended private use of company cars — say, an IKEA parking lot on a 
Sunday. 
When factoring into the equation how the Dutch government came to its 
supposition that some company car drivers may incorrectly file their taxes, this 
particular policy may become less benign and well-intentioned than it appears at first 
sight. After all, it turns out that what is presented as a service towards citizens rather 
seems part of a proactive measure against alleged tax fraud driven by surveillance 
data. The tax authority collected ANPR data and matched these data to its own 
administrative data on company car drivers, which yielded a number of hits on people 
having indicated planning to file for an exemption. The agency thus seemed to 
presume that the behavior of the contacted driver has been suspect, irrespective of the 
actual legality of their conduct. 
Public authorities play a number of different roles, ranging from the execution of 
administrative tasks to law enforcement. In the context of law enforcement, distinct 
competences concerning data collection and processing tend to be strictly defined. 
However, the above example illustrates that authorities themselves can re-use 
collected data to be re-employed for administrative tasks under the moniker of a 
‘service’ to citizens. 
This mechanism implies that surveillance data, normally employed ex post as 
evidence against suspected offenders, is now used ex ante and proactively to ‘remind’ 
non-suspects to be law-abiding citizens. This may lead to the assumption that the 
service is actually an element of an encompassing surveillance and enforcement 
strategy. Even if this proves not to be the case, the nature and origin of the data make 
the service problematic because data are used in a context different from the one in 
which they were originally gathered. Data use in different contexts is not a new 
phenomenon, but in this case each context is related to a different governmental role, 
causing this specific type of use to raise questions in terms of foreseeability, 
legitimacy and accountability of government policy. 
The present paper investigates and theorizes this blurring line between enforcement 
and administrative competences of governments, which is facilitated by data matching 
techniques. We attribute this recent phenomenon to the advent of behavioral research 
into public policy. Proactive policymaking (‘choice architecture’) more closely 
tailored towards actual human behavior has great advantages. The case of the Dutch 
tax authority nevertheless seems to suggest that pre-emptive government policy can 
problematize previously distinct government competences. 
In this paper, we highlight a practice that can be described as the proactive use of 
collected surveillance data, which is enabled by recent developments in technology 
and data matching practices. We analyze this phenomenon, which we coin as 
“Surveillance as a Service”, and theorize on its underlying mechanisms and its impact 
on the citizens concerned. We also suggest a number of architectural and procedural 
measures addressing the blurring role of enforcement and administration through data 
matching, in which both the objectives of governments and the interests of citizens 
are better taken into account. 
The case of the use of surveillance data to personally address citizens before any 
criminal offence has occurred is, to our knowledge, hitherto unique. However, it fits 
within the trend of proactively influencing citizen behavior towards more desirable 
outcomes, which is part and parcel of modern governance. To date, surveillance 
techniques and practices had been excluded from these practices, and the current case 
of the company car drivers thus represents a major crossroads in this area justifying 
scrutiny at the earliest opportunity. Moreover, the careful framing of the surveillance 
practice as a service leads to the assumption that similar procedures may be launched 
shortly. The analysis offered in this paper may help to instill some appropriate 
vigilance. 
Throughout the discussion, one question may continue to linger in the background 
with regard to the government-initiated communication in the cases described in this 
paper: is it a bad thing? Or more specifically: are the rights of the citizens harmed 
when the authorities implement these practices? There are, in extremo, two possible 
answers to this matter. The first one is affirmative, as some observers would consider 
the communication unwarranted, and therefore intruding on the private life of the 
individuals concerned. The opposite reaction is also likely, in which people commend 
the proactive stance of the government, as it actively helps its citizens to prevent 
making mistakes. Both answers are possible, and they display two sides of the same 
coin, as the surveillance of citizens by the authorities always finds itself on the 
continuum between care and control.2 We do not pretend to offer a moral judgment on 
the validity of any of these answers, which is a line of research in current surveillance 
studies in its own right.3 The focus of this paper is on analyzing the novel processes at 
work in the presented cases. The two answers presented above only aim to underscore 
that some people would not conceive of the described mechanisms and associated 
communications strategies as being problematic at all. 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. In the next section, three 
specific cases are presented, each demonstrating a particular government practice 
subject to discussion in this paper. The section following it further develops the 
notion of the two faces of government, being the administrative face and the 
enforcement face. With regard to the latter, section 4 explores two types of 
enforcement (control and investigation) and highlight the differences between the 
two. Based on these elaborations, the case studies are addressed once again, and 
analyzed in terms of the government’s roles and actions. After that, an alternative 
approach of dealing with the problems in the case studies is suggested. The paper 
ends with a summary and some conclusions. 
2   Case studies 
This section describes three case studies, which serve as a factual backdrop for the 
developments introduced above. 
                                                           
2 David Lyon, Surveillance Studies: An Overview (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007). 
3 See e.g., Maria Los, "Looking into the Future: Surveillance, Globalization and the Totalitarian 
Potential," in Theorizing Surveillance - the panopticon and beyond, ed. David Lyon, 
(Cullompton, UK: Willan Publishing, 2008), 69-94. 
2.1   Private use of company cars (The Netherlands) 
As part of a remuneration package, an employee can be rewarded a company car 
which typically may also be used for private purposes. In these cases, the benefit of 
using the car privately is perceived as extra income and is taxed as such. The Dutch 
tax code, however, states that as long as the private use of the car is lower 500 km per 
year, the company car is not subject to taxation.4 To prove that the car has only be 
used for company purposes, the driver must keep a detailed trip registration in which 
every single trip is recorded, including trip purpose, starting address, destination 
address, the distance between the two locations as indicated by the mileage counter, 
etc.5  
The driver may file a ‘Statement of no private car use’,6 in which the driver states 
that she does not intend to use the car for private purposes for more than 500 km per 
year. It is important to realize that even if you have applied for a tax exemption, you 
are still allowed to drive your car privately as long as you stay under the 500 km cap. 
The trip registration must be made available to the tax authorities upon request as a 
control mechanism. 
The issue at hand is the following. Based on ANPR data gathered during the fiscal 
year, the tax authorities proactively contact drivers who have expressed their intention 
to remain under the 500 km cap. They are reminded of the rules governing the private 
use of company cars, and are advised to correctly represent the facts in their 
communications with the tax authorities. These phone calls take place without the tax 
authorities having had access to the trip registration, and before there is any proof that 
drivers are actually committing tax fraud. The phone call is triggered by matching the 
list of drivers who have signed the aforementioned statement, and the vehicles present 
at locations that indicate private car use.7 
2.2   Data matching to evaluate public benefits (United Kingdom) 
In an effort to eliminate fraud in the public sector, the National Fraud Authority 
(NFA) — an executive agency of the Home Office of the United Kingdom — 
launched a number of pilot studies. In one of these pilots, HM Revenue & Customs 
(HMRC) and the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) commissioned private-
sector credit reference agencies (CRAs) and data matching companies to verify the 
                                                           
4 Income Taxation Act 1964 (Wet Op De Loonbelasting 1964). 
5 The company car drivers thus have to produce surveillance data on their vehicle use, which in 
itself can be said to put a burden of bureaucratic precision on individual citizens. 
6 In Dutch: “Verklaring geen privégebruik auto”. For a downloadable copy of the statement see: 
http://download.belastingdienst.nl/belastingdienst/docs/aanvraag_lh_verklaring_geen_prive
gebruik_auto_lh0551z3fol.pdf. 
7 The introduction of mass surveillance to verify data supplied by drivers and to then hold them 
accountable for behavior that is not represented in the disclosed data would only increase the 
burden mentioned in supra 5. It may lead to self-disciplining of citizens, an effect described 
in e.g. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (London: Penguin 
Books, 1991). 
circumstances of 20,000 each of benefit and tax credit claimants, in order to identify 
people falsely claiming to be living alone.8 
For HMRC, CRAs identified 2,000 high‑risk cases which were matched against 
internal HMRC data, which resulted in letters sent to 750 individuals, requesting them 
to either submit proof of living alone or cease to apply for this benefit claims. As a 
result, more than 300 claims were stopped or amended, and more savings are 
expected once remaining cases are followed up. For DWP, two CRAs identified 
between 689 and 2,598 Income Support and Jobseeker’s Allowance claimants as high 
risk. After a match with the DWP’s internal data, the department expects to save 
£0.5m through stopping or amending relevant benefit claims. 
The relevant issue in this case is that the government’s actions are taken based on 
information different from data originally supplied to the DWP by the citizens 
concerned. Instead, other data are used which have been collected and compiled by 
commercial entities, that do not need to adhere to the same level of accountability and 
transparency requirements as government institutions with regard to the source and 
the accuracy of data. Also, since there is no manifest proof of fraud, the government-
initiated communication is presented as an administrative service, requesting the 
citizen to update the information on living circumstances if these, by any chance, may 
not represent actual arrangements anymore. 
2.3   ANPR “ring of steel” (United Kingdom) 
The town of Royston in Hertfordshire is allegedly the first in Britain that will have 
ANPR cameras on every approach to town.9 Seven cameras around Royston will 
record the number plate of every vehicle that passes them, check the plate against a 
series of databases and send alerts to police if the vehicle is untaxed, uninsured, 
suspected of involvement in a crime, or appears on a local or national police 
"hotlist".10 Many of the citizen’s of Royston react positively or indifferently to the 
police initiative. However, others are more concerned. A recurring question is why so 
much information needs to be kept on police records if the sole objective is to catch 
criminals on the spot.11 
This is one of the key elements of the complaint three civil liberties groups have 
filed with the information commissioner concerning the Royston initiative.12 The 
organizations — No CCTV, Privacy International and Big Brother Watch — claim 
the project is unlawful on a number of accounts. Quoting from a 2010 report of the 
Hertfordshire Police Authority Scrutiny Committee, car pictures are apparently held 
for 90 days, and number plate pictures are held for 2 years. These retention periods 
                                                           
8 Cabinet Office and National Fraud Authority, Eliminating Public Sector Fraud: The Counter 
Fraud Taskforce Interim Report (2011), at Annex 2. 
9 Alice Hutton, "Hidden Cameras on All Routes in," Royston Weekly News, March 25, 2011. 
10 Angus Batey, "Welcome to Royston … You're under Surveillance," Guardian, June 29, 
2011. 
11 S.A. Mathieson, "Privacy Groups Take Royston's ANPR Plans to ICO," Guardian, June 10, 
2011. 
12 Charles Farrier, Simon Davies, and Daniel Hamilton, "Complaint Letter to the Information 
Commissioner Concerning Royston ANPR “Ring of Steel”," June 7, 2011. 
appear to be excessive when compared to similar international projects (e.g. a 
comparable Canadian system holds the data for only 72 hours).13 The complaint 
brings a number of other issues to the fore, such as its failure to meet the requirement 
of necessity, which should be judged through its proportionality and subsidiarity. At 
least with regard to proportionality there seem to be problems with the justification of 
the “ring of steel”. Its lawfulness is further challenged by the lack of a specified 
purpose, and the claimants put forward that generic objectives like “the prevention 
and detection of crime, public disorder, terrorism and to remove from public roads 
both unsafe vehicles and unsafe drivers” are far too general to justify the mass 
collection of data. 
For the purposes of this paper, the relevant issue in this case is that enforcement 
agencies are collecting all license plate information as a matter of routine using 
blanket surveillance practices, and retain this information for up to two years without 
any justifying cause. Because of the lack of any specified goal for this mass collection 
of data, it may be put to any use in the months and years to come for aims that by 
definition are unknown at the time of registration. A database with two years of 
individualized movement data can be mined to discover all sorts of correlations that 
should be of no interest to a police force if there is no explicit goal whose legitimacy 
can be challenged in a court of law. The ANPR registration thus puts a liability on the 
future of everyone whose license plate has been scanned, because developments 
beyond the control of the individuals concerned may brand them as a potential target 
for unwarranted police scrutiny in the future, only because their vehicle has crossed 
the town’s limits in the past. 
3   Proactive government: a modern twist to classic roles 
This section outlines the phenomenon we coin as ‘surveillance as a service,’ and 
theorizes this concept as part of the trend towards more proactive government policy-
making that countries like the US, UK and the Netherlands pursue, often based on 
behavioral insights. 
Governments in western democracies these days seem receptive towards insights 
from behavioral (economic) research, which has been popularized by authors like 
Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler.14 Behavioral economics departs from the idea that 
consumers act as non-rational actors in economic transactions, which is contrary to 
the basic premises of neo-classical economics.15 This idea of non-rationality is based 
                                                           
13 Information and Privacy Commissioner/Ontario, "Privacy Investigation: The Toronto Police 
Service's Use of Mobile Licence Plate Recognition Technology to Find Stolen Vehicles," 
(2003). 
14 Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, 
and Happiness, 1st ed. (Yale University Press, 2008). 
15 See e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein and Richard H. Thaler, "A Behavioral Approach to 
Law and Economics," Stanford Law Review 50 (1997): 1471-1550. 
on experimental research demonstrating that ‘real’ people in a lab environment do not 
rationally maximize welfare as assumed by traditional economic theory.16 
The findings of behavioral economic research have trickled down into policy 
circles,17 leading to innovative ways of ‘libertarian paternalistic’ policymaking 
ranging from more efficient ways of registering organ donors via an opt-out 
mechanism, to incentivizing citizens towards behavior that is more friendly to the 
environment. Particularly the British government has been very susceptive to 
behavioral research,18 where prime minister Cameron even instantiated a ‘Behavioral 
Insights Team’ (BIT) as part of the Cabinet Office, whose aim it its to help the UK 
government develop and apply lessons from behavioral economics and behavioral 
science to public policy making. In short, it supports government departments in 
designing policy that better reflects how people really behave, not how they are 
assumed to behave.19 
Similar initiatives have been introduced informally in neighboring countries, such 
as the Netherlands.20 The British BIT has sparked initiatives in fields as diverse as 
healthcare, consumer empowerment and energy efficiency.21 Interestingly, the BIT 
also endeavors to use behavioral research to fight fraud and other forms of crime and 
as such collaborates with the also newly instantiated National Fraud Authority (NFA) 
— also a part of the Cabinet Office. The two groups jointly worked on a successful 
project where people who had overdue tax debt the year before were contacted 
informally the next year and were notified of how many people in their region had 
already filed their taxes on time. This prompted more of these people to file their 
taxes before the due date.22  
This successful collaboration between the BIT and NFA was premised on a data 
matching methodology: a dataset on tax payment of individuals was combined with 
residential records. Indeed, data matching is a methodology often used to counter 
fraud, in which formerly unrelated databases are matched to detect fraudulent 
behavior. Data matching has been embraced enthusiastically by governments,23 and is 
increasingly framed by public authorities as well as a way to make relations between 
citizens and governments more efficient in similar ways as behavioral research is 
                                                           
16 For a brief outline of the methodology of behavioral economic research, see: George 
Loewenstein, "Experimental Economics from the Vantage-Point of Behavioural 
Economics," The Economic Journal 109, February (1999): F25-F34.. 
17 Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, "Libertarian Paternalism," The American Economic 
Review 93 (2003): 175-179. 
18 David Wintour, "David Cameron's 'Nudge Unit' Aims to Improve Economic Behaviour," 
Guardian, September 9, 2010. 
19 Gus O'Donnell, "Applying Behavioural Insights," Cabinet Office, accessed November 29, 
2011, http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/content/applying-behavioural-insights. 
20 Peter Kooreman and Henriëtte Prast, "What Does Behavioral Economics Mean for Policy? 
Challenges to Savings and Health Policies in the Netherlands," De Economist 158, no. 2 
(2010): 101-122. 
21 Cabinet Office Behavioural Insights Team, "Behavioural Insights Team Annual Update 
2010–11," 2011. 
22 Cabinet Office Behavioural Insights Team, "Behavioural Insights Team Annual Update 
2010–11," 2011, p. 17. 
23 Australian Government, "Data-Matching Program (Assistance and Tax) Act 1990," 
C2006C00591, 1990. 
supposed to.24 It seems that the promise of behavioral research-driven policy fueled 
by data matching techniques allows for the blending of formerly distinct roles of 
public authorities. The next section investigates these different governmental roles in 
more detail. 
3.1   Two classic roles of government 
In daily life, government plays a multitude of roles, which precludes a simple 
categorization of its roles and responsibilities. For instance, approaches towards 
definitions of the modern state include, with reference to Weber, Hobbes, and Marx, 
amongst others, the monopoly of the means of violence, sovereignty, public 
bureaucracy, and citizenship.25 However, two faces can be discerned that are readily 
recognizable. The first one is the government’s administrative face. In this role, it 
takes care of administrative tasks to the benefit of the citizen, such as supplying 
official documents like passports and driving licenses. It also exercises community 
functions (e.g. supplying building permits), organizes and upholds certain facilities 
for the benefit of the people (e.g. the educational system) and takes the lead in large 
projects that would be beyond the capacities of individual citizens (e.g. large 
infrastructural works). Although political preferences of the day dictate to what extent 
the government should play a role in any of these areas, all functions have in essence 
been delegated to the government for reasons of fairness, efficiency, and 
effectiveness. This is the area in which the authorities are perceived as delivering 
‘services’ to the citizens. 
The second face of government is its enforcement face. This is the area in which it 
upholds the law, and executes associated tasks like crime prevention and criminal 
prosecution. For these purposes, the government is bestowed with investigative 
powers that are strictly regulated and may only be exercised if certain conditions are 
met. Also, only specified actors within the government domain, of which the police 
are a prime example, may use these powers. The distinction between the 
administrative face and the enforcement face of government is not clear-cut in every 
area. Take for instance the tax domain. Many of the tasks belong to the administrative 
realm, such as the yearly processing of income tax filings and the collection of the 
amounts due. However, tax authorities are granted enforcement powers as well, which 
may be exercised in order to collect assets from tax subjects who are unwilling to pay, 
or to commence investigative actions when tax fraud is suspected. 
In practice, the two faces can be distinguished in most Western jurisdictions, even 
though the exact definition of the purpose of the state and the scope of this purpose 
shows variations. This is due to differences in the development process of the state 
and its functions, in particular between civil law jurisdictions as can be found on the 
                                                           
24 „Ultimately, improving data matching will help us to better measure the effectiveness of 
multiple programs, and more efficiently target resources to achieve goals like promoting 
more work and earnings, reducing poverty, and ending dependence on government benefits. 
These are goals that we should all agree on.”, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on 
Ways and Means, Human Resources Subcommittee Hearing on the Use of Data Matching to 
Improve Customer Service, Program Integrity, and Taxpayer Savings, March 11, 2011. 
25 C. Pierson, The Modern State. (London: Routledge, 2004), pp. 4-26. 
European continent and the Common Law tradition of the United Kingdom. The UK 
is a state, but not a nation, and its evolvement has taken place along the lines of rather 
uncoordinated events that, step by step, developed the legal relations between the 
state and the citizens, as well as the distribution of powers.26 
At a more fundamental level, the two faces can be related to the classical 
(democratic) constitutional state and the social constitutional state. In the classical 
constitutional state, the role of the government was mainly related to the protection of 
constitutional rights based on fundamental rights. In order to offer this protection, 
certain acts, such as murder, violence, and discrimination, were legally prohibited, 
and the state was empowered with enforcement capacities to uphold the law. This role 
of the state can also be referred to as Ordnungspolitik or the aggrandizement of power 
of the Machtstaat.27 This role forms the basis of the investigative powers related to the 
enforcement face.28 The social constitutional state is offering more ‘social’ protection, 
such as health care and education, and employment facilities. This is more related to 
the administrative face, including regulating health care standards and providing 
documents that allow people to work or receive education.29 Other indications for this 
role are the soziale Gestaltungspolitik or the ‘educative state’ as the basis of social 
morality.30 
Tensions ensue when, in the interaction with citizens, government presents its 
administrative face using information, which it may only have gathered in its 
enforcement role. The first case supplied in the previous section is a good example of 
this practice. ANPR data, the collection of which is sanctioned by the government’s 
enforcement powers, are used to directly address people through channels that — 
until that day — have been used as the administrative face of government. The 
example illustrates a tendency amongst policymakers in which administrative and law 
enforcement tasks blend into each other. However, it should be borne in mind that 
administrative duties and law enforcement are based on distinct competences that 
through policies such as the one described above may become mingled. This raises 
questions of foreseeability, legitimacy and accountability of government policy. 
Proactive government policy may be more efficient; it can also be intrusive and 
premised on an authority that is legally suspect.  
                                                           
26 J. Alder, Constitutional and Administrative Law. (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 
pp. 94-95. 
27 K.H.F. Dyson, The State Tradition in Western Europe; A Study of an Idea and Institution. 
(Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980), p. 223. 
28 M.C. Burkens et al., Beginselen Van De Democratische Rechtsstaat. 5th ed. (Deventer: 
W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink, 2001), p. 18. 
29 M.C. Burkens et al., Beginselen Van De Democratische Rechtsstaat. 5th ed. (Deventer: 
W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink, 2001), p. 26. 
30 K.H.F. Dyson, The State Tradition in Western Europe; A Study of an Idea and Institution. 
(Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980), p. 223. 
4   Control vs. investigation 
It is useful to distinguish between two typical powers that may be invoked by 
authorities to uphold the law, ‘control’ and ‘investigation’.31 Actually, these two 
powers have their own distinctive competences attributed to authorities. First, the 
power of ‘control’ allows the authorities to check whether the general public adheres 
to the rules as codified in law. One example are speed traps: by measuring the 
velocity of all passing vehicles at a designated spot, it is possible to probe whether the 
drivers adhere to the limits set out in the law. The characteristics of ‘control’ are 
twofold. First, it is not required that an unlawful act has been committed before the 
control mechanism is employed. By definition, it is only by using the control 
mechanism that unlawful acts can be detected, and control measures therefore have a 
preventative nature.32 Thus, setting up a speed trap does not require the evidence that 
people have been speeding at that location. A second important characteristic is that 
control is indiscriminate (i.e. not personalized). Any subject that satisfies the 
definitions in the law (e.g., drivers of motor vehicles) is checked when the control 
mechanism is put in place, without any knowledge (nor interest, for that matter) about 
the identity of the driver. It is only after an offense has been established that the 
identity of the driver is required, because an essential element of enforcing this 
particular law is to fine the responsible driver for his failure to observe the set speed 
limits. In cases where rights and freedoms of citizens may be affected, the exercise of 
control measures has to be legitimized by legal provisions. Moreover, there may be no 
conflict with non-codified law nor with general legal principles.33 
The second power is the power of ‘investigation’. In such a case, there is always an 
immediate cause to start an investigation. One reason may be that it is obvious that a 
crime has been committed (e.g., a murder victim is found), or if there is a strong 
suspicion that a criminal act has occurred (e.g., the data provided on a tax return give 
the impression of fraudulent behavior). When the criminal investigation is started, 
there is often already someone suspected (e.g. the filer of the tax return), which 
contrasts with the concept of ‘control’ introduced above. Even when there is no 
suspect yet, for instance in a murder case without any witnesses, the investigation is 
still aimed at discovering the identity of the individual responsible for the crime. In 
other words, investigations are conducted only after sufficient justification is 
established in the form of substantial evidence or specific suspect behavior. 
Investigative powers are therefore applied in an ex post fashion. The use of 
investigative competences requires a concrete suspicion of a criminal act.34 This act 
has to be punishable as provided by a specific legal provision, which implies that as 
                                                           
31 G.J.M. Corstens, Het Nederlands Strafprocesrecht, 3rd ed. (Deventer: Gouda Quint, 1999), 
p. 21. 
32 G.P.A. Aler, De Politiebevoegdheid Bij Opsporing En Controle (Zwolle: W.E.J. Tjeenk 
Willink, 1982), p. 4 and 30. 
33 G.J.M. Corstens, Het Nederlands Strafprocesrecht, 3rd ed. (Deventer: Gouda Quint, 1999), 
p. 22. 
34 G.P.A. Aler, De Politiebevoegdheid Bij Opsporing En Controle (Zwolle: W.E.J. Tjeenk 
Willink, 1982), p. 29. 
long as there is no punishable act, the exercise of investigative powers is not 
allowed.35 
Tensions arise when control measures take the form of an investigation. This is the 
case in the first case supplied in section 2. There are rules about the conditions under 
which a taxpayer may claim exemption to having to pay additional taxes on the use of 
a company car. Ordinarily, these rules would be upheld through the process of 
control: after the tax return has been filed, a check would be performed on all 
company car drivers to see whether they adhere to the rules. Only after a suspicion 
arises that some of these claimants have not played by the book, an investigation may 
be conducted into the details of the individual tax returns of these drivers. Thus, the 
move from the control regime to the investigation regime (and the associated move 
from a general regime to an individualized regime) is only made after establishing 
suspicious behavior. This is, once again, an example of ex post investigation. 
In this case, the individuals are subject to an investigative approach before they 
have filed their tax return, i.e. before there is any data provided by the tax subjects 
themselves, which might garner an interest by the investigating authorities. Instead, 
the data leading to an individual investigation are collected using a ‘control’ 
approach, in which first all vehicles present at a certain location and time are 
registered using ANPR with the specific purpose to enforce taxation laws.36 Then, a 
data match is conducted, in which all company car drivers who have indicated that 
they are planning to stay within the 500 km exemption are highlighted. Only this 
specific subset is addressed in a one-to-one ‘reminder’ by the tax authorities. It is 
important to remember that the presence at that time and location in itself is not 
illegal, as the occasional trip to the IKEA may well fall within the limits of the 500 
‘private’ km cap. Only if these drivers would claim on their tax returns not to have 
exceeded the 500 km cap and proof would show this to be a misrepresentation of 
facts, there would be a good case for an individual investigation. Instead of the ex post 
investigation which is customary in case of criminal investigations, the ex ante 
investigation which befalls the company car drivers concerned represents a radical 
new notion of the authorities’ enforcement role, as will be further analyzed in the next 
section. 
5   Analysis 
In all three cases of section 2, surveillance elements are present, but the means of data 
collection and the presentation of data analysis findings to the individuals differ. 
In the case of the ANPR “ring of steel” around the town of Royston, the data are 
collected on account of the enforcement powers of the authorities. In fact, the Royston 
case is a demonstration of a ‘control’ approach, which moves to investigation after a 
match with any of the connected databases occurs. This approach is becoming 
                                                           
35 G.J.M. Corstens, Het Nederlands Strafprocesrecht, 3rd ed. (Deventer: Gouda Quint, 1999), 
p. 15. 
36 In a similar fashion, speed cameras are used as a tool to enforce speed limits and to catch 
speeding incidents, Both approaches qualify as control measures, because all cars within 
reach of the cameras are recorded for a specific purpose that has been defined in advance. 
increasingly prevalent, and is a demonstration of the electronic execution of 
traditional enforcement powers. However, in cases where there is no match, the 
collected ANPR data remain on file with the authorities for up to two years, which 
calls into question the proportionality and subsidiarity of the measure: one can 
seriously wonder whether the demonstrated blanket surveillance and massive data 
collection meet these criteria. The consequence of this long-term data retention of 
detailed ANPR data is that the potential for an individual investigation keeps looming, 
and may be triggered by circumstances that are unknown at the time of registration. If 
such an investigation would befall any of the individuals whose vehicle is associated 
with any misdemeanor in the future, the authorities are likely to exercise all 
enforcement powers available to them. 
In contrast to the above case, the example of data matching to prevent fraud in the 
UK does not use surveillance data recorded on account of an enforcement power. 
Instead, commercially available information is acquired and combined with 
information on file with the authorities. In principle, any output that would result in a 
high suspicion of benefit fraud would lend itself to the start of an investigation aimed 
at specific individuals, but in this case authorities decided to ask benefits recipients 
whether their files still reflected the actual situation. The advantages of this approach 
are obvious: one well-written reminder has an immediate and sizable effect, and does 
away with the necessity of commencing individual investigations that may take much 
time and effort (and funds) to complete in accordance with the strictly defined legal 
provisions. Thus, some of the data used are obtained from non-governmental sources, 
and the people who are suspect are approached individually. As opposed to the 
Royston case, the consequence of this strategy is that the authorities cannot use their 
enforcement face, since no official investigation has been started: the communication 
must necessarily be drafted as an administrative matter. 
A similar situation exists in the case of the company car drivers, in which no crime 
has been committed before the drivers file a fraudulent tax return, which is why the 
authorities cannot rely on their enforcement face. Still, they want to stimulate 
taxpayers to represent the facts concerning the private use of their cars correctly, 
which explains why they have to revert to their administrative face and present their 
findings as a service to the individual company car drivers, in spite of the fact that 
relevant data have been gathered through enforcement competences. Surveillance as a 
Service sees the light, and the practice may be considered as intimidating by many 
company car drivers, particularly because the individualized approach normally 
reserved for criminal investigations is now applied in a situation which would only 
justify a regular ‘control’ procedure. 
The last two cases are also applications of behavioral economics in policy circles, a 
trend that was highlighted in section 3. The mere suggestion by the authorities of their 
willingness to apply their enforcement powers intends to nudge individuals into 
desired behavior, thus rendering a personalized investigative route superfluous. The 
case of the company cars is in this respect all the more remarkable, since this is an 
example in which surveillance data gathered by the authorities employing 
enforcement capabilities are actively used to steer citizen’s behavior to align with 
governmental objectives without reverting to investigative action. 
The question remains why the phenomenon described in the three case studies 
triggers feelings of unease amongst many people. More importantly, the 
developments discussed here are symptomatic of the use of investigative powers in a 
growing number of areas, spurred by the possibilities offered by new technologies. 
This potentially has serious consequences for the organization of society, especially 
concerning the power balance between the citizens and the state. In an attempt to 
identify certain thresholds that might be crossed in such processes we will further 
analyze the first case study in a step-by-step fashion. 
As a starting point, it should be acknowledged that the type of fraud possible with 
the private use of company cars can only be combated when information is collected 
on the actual use of the vehicle in the year previous to filing date of the tax return. So, 
if someone drives a company car throughout 2012, the tax return is due only by April 
1, 2013. If the authorities want to call the correctness of the tax filing into question, 
they would logically need to have information on the actual use in 2012 at their 
disposal. Otherwise, they would not be able to have any proof in case of a 
prosecution. The use of ANPR to collect information for such purposes is thus 
understandable, as it is merely deployed as a technique to collect relevant data for a 
specific aim at a particular location for a restricted period of time. Moreover, a proper 
implementation of ANPR technology would allow for immediate deletion of non-
relevant data, thus staying within the confines of the purpose of the data collection 
(i.e., control against illegitimate private use). 
It is also a logical step to match the information collected through ANPR with the 
identity of the individual company car driver when an actual act has occurred which 
would justify such a data matching procedure. This is the straightforward method of 
producing incriminating evidence against suspected tax evaders. So far, few people 
would object to this practice. However, should the data still be matched when an 
actual justification for that step is lacking? One may argue that this is not a problem 
as long as this information is kept within the confines of the tax authorities. 
Nevertheless, the mere act of data matching creates a new category of tax subjects, 
namely a group of people who have driven their car privately but who have stayed 
within the limits of the law. It may be claimed that, exactly because the individuals 
remain within the limits of the law, they do not merit special attention. Without a 
good reason, this category should not be created to start with, as flagging is 
vulnerable to function creep.37 By creating these types of unwarranted categories, 
certain questionable scenarios become possible. Imagine what would happen if you 
were to fall into this category for a few years in a row: some tax inspector might 
consider you to be a high profile target for a closer inspection, although you have 
never strayed outside the law. 
The final step is that the individual company car driver is confronted with the data 
match before she has committed the act of falsely representing facts on a tax return. 
There are serious questions to be posed concerning this proactive approach, because 
there has never been an act38 to merit such individual attention by the tax authorities. 
The fact that a probabilistic approach to some future decision is taken (“People who 
go to the IKEA on Sundays with their company car are likely to commit fraud in their 
                                                           
37 See e.g., Christine Bellamy, "Alive and Well? The 'Surveillance Society' and the Coalition," 
Public Policy and Administration 26, no. 1 (2011): 149-55, and Wetenschappelijke Raad 
voor het Regeringsbeleid. iOverheid (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2011). 
38 In Dutch: handeling 
tax return.”), in fact implies that the entire concept of the “presumption of innocence” 
is dropped. At least, you are apparently a little less innocent if you belong to a group 
of people who, statistically spoken, are more likely to commit fraud.39 
Overall, one specific effect is that the innocence of people is not used as a starting 
point anymore. Under Dutch law, the definition40 of a criminal offense is a fact 
(which can be performing or neglecting an act) that is unlawful and attributable to 
blame. In the cases described in this paper, the fact mentioned in the definition is 
lacking. Therefore, there is no rightful justification for the use of investigative 
powers. More and more applications of data matching are becoming a reality thanks 
to the increasingly more powerful possibilities afforded by modern technologies to 
support massive data collection against low costs. These rapid technological 
developments may unwittingly underexpose the requirement of a fact for the law to 
apply.  
6   Process modification 
The analysis has shown in detail what consecutive steps are taken in cases that present 
surveillance as a service. Even without taking a moral stance on the acceptability of 
the approach, one can safely assume it yields positive effects in terms of increased tax 
income and a lesser need to launch costly investigations. One wonders whether the 
same benefits might materialize using the same (types of) technology, but without the 
associated surveillance aspects. In our opinion, this should be feasible by adapting the 
data collection and matching process in line with the suggestions provided below for 
the company car case. The suggestions are based on basic principles of data 
protection as laid down in Directive 95/46/EC.41 
In order to examine whether people truthfully represent the actual circumstances 
during the time period subject to taxation, it is necessary to collect information during 
that period. Only by confronting the claims of the tax subjects with the evidence 
gathered by the tax authorities throughout the fiscal year, irregularities may become 
apparent, which may lead to further investigations. In case of the company cars, it is 
therefore acceptable that ANPR data are collected of cars at potentially suspect 
locations, such as border crossings during holiday weekends. 
                                                           
39 Statistical inference using data collected through surveillance may result in social sorting, 
discrimination and accumulated disadvantage. See e.g., Oscar H. Gandy, "Quixotics unite! 
Engaging the pragmatists on rational discrimination," in Theorizing Surveillance - the 
panopticon and beyond, ed. David Lyon, (Cullompton, UK: Willan Publishing, 2008), 318-
336. In this particular case, the subgroup of people who visit IKEA on Sundays is also more 
intensively scrutinized as a result of the classification process described. The societal effects 
are however less prevalent, because the subgroup is less susceptible to future discrimination. 
40 In Dutch: “Voor een strafbaar feit moet sprake zijn van een feit, dat in strijd is met het recht 
en waarvan de bedrijver een verwijt gemaakt kan worden (dus waaraan deze schuld heeft)”, 
J. Remmelink, Inleiding Tot De Studie Van Het Nederlandse Strafrecht, 14th ed. (Arnhem: 
Gouda Quint B.V., 1995), p. 126. 
41 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, OJ L 281, 23.11.1995, p. 31–50. 
The choice of so-called suspect locations is critical, as it must balance the 
requirement of collecting enough relevant data to be used as a basis for effective fraud 
investigations with the need to prevent disproportionate surveillance. This would 
justify the focus on times and places where one would not expect business use of 
company cars (e.g., the IKEA parking lot on a Sunday). A potential problem is 
constituted by false positives caused by the systemic consequences of the data 
collection setup (e.g., an IKEA employee with a company car working on Sundays, 
who might find herself to be the subject of a closer investigation). Such effects are 
inevitable, but may be perceived as an acceptable downside of the control system. It is 
key to understand these systemic effects in advance and treat them with due caution, 
such as by basing all subsequent investigative steps on the presupposition that the 
subject is indeed a false positive. If this is done prudently, the impact on the lives of 
the people finding themselves in these suspect locations may be minimized. 
In the proposed modified procedure the collected data — only existing of a license 
plate number associated with a location and a time stamp — are not processed any 
further, but are stored at a secure location until the moment the tax filings are received 
(i.e. in the year following the year in which we want to establish the potential private 
use of company cars). At that time, it is possible to match the number plates of the 
taxpayers who claim to stay below the 500 km threshold with the number plates of 
vehicles that have been spotted at unusual locations. Only when the same license plate 
is encountered in both files, there is a justified reason to start an investigation. This is 
the moment in which the ‘hits’ may be enriched with personal data of the drivers, 
which may subsequently be contacted as part of an investigation. All other ANPR 
data may be destroyed after the initial data match, as these would not benefit any 
further investigative purposes. 
The proposed alternative process effectively protects the interests of all people who 
are not concerned, and it complies better with certain principles set out in the national 
implementations of the European Data Protection Directive.42 For instance, if the 
essential step of enriching the set of license plates with personal information of the 
vehicle drivers is performed after the data match between the ANPR data with the tax 
returns, the principle of data minimization as laid down in article 6(3) of the 
Directive43 is better respected. Another example is the concept of purpose 
specification as expressed in Art. 6(1) (a) of the Data Protection Directive, which 
requires that “[…] personal data must be collected for a specified, explicit and 
legitimate purposes and not further processed in a way incompatible with those 
purposes.” Once again, the enrichment of the ANPR data with additional personal 
information after the data match would better respect this principle44 than the current 
                                                           
42 Directive 95/46/EC has been implemented in the national legislation of each EU member 
state (e.g., the Wbp in the Netherlands and the DPA in the United Kingdom). 
43 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, OJ L 281, 23.11.1995, p. 31–50. 
44 We refer to the Personal Data Protection Act as the legal framework against which the 
processing of personal data should be assessed. Considering the nature of the cases, and the 
involvement of actors with investigative powers, specific laws related to these actors are 
relevant as well. These laws contain comparable data protection principles. The point is that 
practice, because the particular processing act would be specifically linked to the 
express purpose of combating tax evasion. In short, both processing steps should only 
be taken if a specific purpose is present. The first step is building a data set for future 
reference, and the second step is enhancement of the data set with additional personal 
information of individuals whose deeds actually qualify them as a suspect (i.e. after 
the filing of their tax return). 
The net result of data protection in this alternative model is that citizens who are 
not suspect are not confronted with individual ‘warnings’, thus protecting them from 
undue collection and processing of data. Moreover, clear guidelines and associated 
communication on the enforcement practices employed would also make such 
systems transparent and amenable to public (legal) scrutiny. An important 
consequence of our proposed model is that more ANPR data need to be retained for a 
longer period, which may seem counter-intuitive from a data protection perspective. 
However, the focus is not on the storage of the data but on their eventual use. In fact, 
we are encouraging authorities to exercise restraint in the further processing of data 
through data matching. 
The proposed alternative process eliminates the individualized investigation 
preceding the actual act of filing a tax return, and would thus remove the surveillance 
character of the tax authorities’ behavior. However, the authorities might still be able 
to effectively nudge taxpayers into filing a correct tax return. By generally 
announcing that the information supplied by company car drivers will be the subject 
of intensive scrutiny in a certain year, the prospective taxpayers may be forewarned 
and adjust their tax filing behavior accordingly. Such a warning may even be 
communicated to company car drivers only, thus targeting a specific group of 
taxpayers. The nudging effect of addressing the entire population of company car 
drivers as a group at the moment of filing the tax return instead of as individuals at a 
moment months prior to the filing may indeed be somewhat lower. However, it has as 
a distinct advantage that it does not rely on the disciplining effects of surveillance as a 
service. 
7   Conclusion 
This paper employed three cases to illustrate a shift in the relationship between the 
government and its citizens when it comes to the use of surveillance data for law 
enforcement purposes. The case of the ANPR cameras surrounding the town of 
Royston was a demonstration of surveillance data to be used for individual 
investigation after a violation of the law has been established. Because of its ex post 
character, the authorities can thus use their enforcement face during prosecution. In 
the case of data matching using information from commercial credit rating agencies to 
elicit potential fraudsters, the people targeted were not prosecuted but simply asked 
whether the information held on them was still accurate. As individual investigations 
are not under discussion yet, the authorities cannot rely on enforcement measures, but 
                                                                                                                                              
— no matter which legal regime is applicable — the suggested alternative process respects 
these principles better than the current practice does. 
have to present their actions as administrative matters. In the last case of the company 
car drivers there is again no individual prosecution, but this time the authorities rely 
on surveillance data obtained through enforcement powers as a basis for addressing 
certain citizens. This particular construct was dubbed “Surveillance as a service”, 
because the authorities themselves frame their actions as proactively providing 
services aimed at making life easier for citizens by helping them to prevent any 
unfortunate mistakes. 
All cases use data matching as a starting point, but only the first aims to use the 
newly created information to start individual investigations after a violation of the law 
has been established. The last two cases demonstrate how the authorities aim to guide 
citizens into desired behavior before any proof of a criminal offense exists. Merely 
raising the awareness of the potential availability of incriminating information should 
be sufficient to reach certain government objectives, nudging citizens to do the right 
thing without having to resort to costly individual investigations. 
The use of surveillance data to influence people before any factual proof exists 
may be considered by some as intrusive, as it removes essential elements of the 
expected safeguards against government interference with citizens’ private lives. By 
outlining a modified process with regard to the last case, we demonstrated that similar 
policy objectives may be attained without resorting to the potentially intimidating use 
of enforcement data. Although the nudging effect may be somewhat lower, the 
transgressive use of surveillance data to exert influence on an individualized level 
without proof of an unlawful act is thus constrained. 
 
Acknowledgement The authors greatly acknowledge the anonymous reviewers for their 
valuable comments on draft versions of this paper. 
Bibliography 
Alder, J. Constitutional and Administrative Law. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. 
Aler, G.P.A. De Politiebevoegdheid Bij Opsporing En Controle. Zwolle: W.E.J. Tjeenk 
Willink, 1982. 
Alfen, Sameer van. "Fiscus Bespioneert Leaserijders." De Telegraaf, February 11, 2011. 
Australian Government. "Data-Matching Program (Assistance and Tax) Act 1990." In 
C2006C00591, 1990. 
Batey, Angus. "Welcome to Royston … You're under Surveillance." Guardian, June 29, 2011. 
Bellamy, Christine. "Alive and Well? The 'Surveillance Society' and the Coalition." Public 
Policy and Administration 26, no. 1 (2011): 149-55. 
Burkens, M.C., H.R.B.M. Kummeling, B.P. Vermeulen, and R.J.G.M. Widdershoven. 
Beginselen Van De Democratische Rechtsstaat. 5th ed. Deventer: W.E.J. Tjeenk 
Willink, 2001. 
Cabinet Office Behavioural Insights Team. "Behavioural Insights Team Annual Update 2010–
11." 2011. 
Corstens, G.J.M. Het Nederlands Strafprocesrecht. 3rd ed. Deventer: Gouda Quint, 1999. 
Dyson, K.H.F. The State Tradition in Western Europe; A Study of an Idea and Institution. 
Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980. 
European Commission. "Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of 
personal data and on the free movement of such data," OJ L 281, 23.11.1995, p. 31–
50.  
Farrier, Charles, Simon Davies, and Daniel Hamilton. "Complaint Letter to the Information 
Commissioner Concerning Royston Anpr “Ring of Steel”." June 7, 2011. 
Hutton, Alice. "Hidden Cameras on All Routes In." Royston Weekly News, March 25, 2011. 
"Income Taxation Act 1964 (Wet Op De Loonbelasting 1964)." 1964. 
Information and Privacy Commissioner/Ontario. "Privacy Investigation: The Toronto Police 
Service's Use of Mobile Licence Plate Recognition Technology to Find Stolen 
Vehicles." 2003. 
Jolls, Christine, Cass R. Sunstein, and Richard H. Thaler. "A Behavioral Approach to Law and 
Economics." Stanford Law Review 50 (1997): 1471-1550. 
Kooreman, Peter, and Henriëtte Prast. "What Does Behavioral Economics Mean for Policy? 
Challenges to Savings and Health Policies in the Netherlands." De Economist 158, 
no. 2 (2010): 101-122. 
Loewenstein, George. "Experimental Economics from the Vantage-Point of Behavioural 
Economics." The Economic Journal 109, no. February (1999): F25-F34. 
Los, Maria. "Looking into the Future: Surveillance, Globalization and the Totalitarian 
Potential." In Theorizing Surveillance - the Panopticon and Beyond, edited by David 
Lyon, 69-94. Cullompton, UK: Willan Publishing, 2008. 
Lyon, David. Surveillance Studies: An Overview. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007. 
Mathieson, S.A. "Privacy Groups Take Royston's ANPR Plans to ICO." Guardian, June 10, 
2011. 
O'Donnell, Gus. "Applying Behavioural Insights." Cabinet Office, 
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/content/applying-behavioural-insights. 
Pierson, C. The Modern State. London: Routledge, 2004. 
Remmelink, J. Inleiding Tot De Studie Van Het Nederlandse Strafrecht. 14th ed. Arnhem: 
Gouda Quint B.V., 1995. 
Sluijs, Jasper. "The Dutch Tax Authority and Lease Car Fraud: Institutionalized Intimidation."  
http://vortex.uvt.nl/TILTblog/?p=291. 
Thaler, Richard H., and Cass R. Sunstein. "Libertarian Paternalism." The American Economic 
Review 93 (2003): 175-79. 
———. Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness. 1st ed: Yale 
University Press, 2008. 
U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means. "Human Resources 
Subcommittee Hearing on the Use of Data Matching to Improve Customer Service, 
Program Integrity, and Taxpayer Savings." March 11, 2011. 
Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid. iOverheid. Amsterdam: Amsterdam 
University Press, 2011. 
Wintour, David. "David Cameron's 'Nudge Unit' Aims to Improve Economic Behaviour." 
Guardian, September 9, 2010. 
